OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

PRINCIPLES AND TENDENCY

OF THE

EAST INDIA BILLS

PROPOSED BY

The Right Honourable CHARLES JAMES FOX,

AND

The Right Honourable WILLIAM PITT,

WITH

Short Sketches of their Political Characters.

Simul ſuis virtutibtus, ſimul vitiis aliorum in ipſam gloriam præceps agebatur, TACIT. DE VIT. AGRICOLÆ.

LONDON:

Printed for J. STOCKDALE, oppoſite Burlington-Houſe, Piccadilly. 1784.

PRICE ONE SHILLING AND SIX-PENCE.

46
1
6201

OBSERVATIONS,

&c. &c. &c.

THOUGH I am not a Member of Parliament, yet as an Engliſhman, enjoying the bleſſings of the Conſtitution, I am eſſentially intereſted in every meaſure which can either directly, or collaterally affect its ſtability, injure its perfection, or contaminate its purity; uninfluenced by prejudice to party, or partiality to men, my *attention* has been ſeriouſly turned to the conſideration of the different means, which have been propoſed for the attainment of that univerſally-acknowledged neceſſary object, *A better government and ma-*

nagement of our concerns in the Eaſt-Indies. I ſhall make no apology for offering to the public the ſentiments and opinion of an undiſtinguiſhed individual of the nation, upon a ſubject which has been ſo ably diſcuſſed, and ſo long conteſted by the greateſt men, and moſt diſtinguiſhed political characters of this political country. The ſophiſtry of particular ſyſtems, and the profeſſed predeterminations of party combination, have cramped the abilities, diſordered the judgment, and leſſened the weight of the eminent perſons who have exerted themſelves on either ſide of the queſtion. As an unprejudiced man, concerned only for the ſafety and exiſtence of a Conſtitution, from whoſe proſperity I derive happineſs, and in whoſe deſtruction my deareſt intereſts muſt be involved; I feel it my duty to ſubmit the reſult of my obſervation and reflections to the conſideration and judgment of my fellow ſubjects.

The ſtate of the India Company, from great acquiſition of property, within a ſhort period, has involved the intereſts of the

State

State ſo much with thoſe of the Company, as to make the politics and reſources of the one in a great meaſure dependent upon the adminiſtration of the other: the immenſe field opened for the operations of war and revenue in the Eaſt, have preſented temptations to the ambition and avarice of the Company's chief ſervants abroad, too great (in the words of Lord Clive) for fleſh and blood to reſiſt; ſcenes of devaſtation and extortion, equal to thoſe of a Roman Pro-Conſul, in the moſt depraved periods of that republic, have been for a ſeries of years exhibited in that country by the ſervants of the Company; who, with very few, and even thoſe qualified exceptions, have been ſolely intent upon the gratification of their paſſions, and the accumulation of wealth, whilſt the intereſts of the Company, and the Public, have been neglected, or ſacrificed in the purſuit of thoſe objects, at the ſame time that the character of the nation has been diſgraced, and its name rendered odious by the means employed to attain them.—The commercial intereſt of the Company languiſhing; its capital depreciated; and its adminiſtration

adminiſtration become a ſcene of jobbing, and intrigue, inſtead of trade and induſtry; were circumſtances which early alarmed the Public; excited the atttention of the Legiſlature, and called for its interference. In 1783 an act was paſſed, regulating the adminiſtration of the Company's affairs in India, and by laws appointing Perſons for that purpoſe, with powers defined, and entruſted to them by the Legiſlature; theſe regulations, however ſalutary they appeared in theory, were found ineffectual in practice; various circumſtances, which it is not neceſſary to particularize, added to the great temptations which perſons acting under it, had to deviate from its reſtrictions; as well as the very complicated ſcene of politics, which, in ſome inſtances, might make diſcretionary exertions juſtifiable, or even neceſſary, have proved *that* arrangement at ſo remote a diſtance ineffectual: the preſſure of temporary diſtreſs from the events, difficulties, and burthens of war, added to the enormity of accumulated and growing abuſes, called for a great and effectual interpoſition of legiſlative authority and

and wiſdom. I ſhall now examine the principal clauſes of the two Eaſt-India Bills, which have been preſented to the Houſe of Commons, for the purpoſe of remedying theſe evils, and which have been ſeverally rejected by different branches of the Legiſlature; I ſhall conſider the principles and tendency of each, and endeavour from thence to deduce the characters, tenets, and purſuits of the two great political characters who framed and introduced the different Bills: I will firſt begin with that which was firſt propoſed.

The preamble of the Bill ſtates, that "Whereas diſorders of an alarming nature "and magnitude have prevailed, and do "ſtill continue and increaſe, in the ma- "nagement of the territorial poſſeſſions, "the revenues, and the commerce of this "kingdom in the Eaſt-Indies; by means "whereof the proſperity of the natives "hath been greatly diminiſhed, and the "valuable intereſts of this nation in the "ſaid territorial poſſeſſions, revenues, and "commerce, have been materially impaired, "and would probably fall into utter ruin

if

" if an immediate and fitting remedy were " not provided; be it therefore enact- " ed, &c."

The firſt meaſure propoſed in the Bill, as a preliminary to the intended remedies, to be applied to the evils enumerated in the preamble, is a total deprivation of the powers now veſted in the body of Proprietors, and in twenty-four Directors, choſen by them for the management of their affairs; to transfer the ſame powers, or in the words of the act, " all and ſingular, " the powers and authorities which have " been *at any time* heretofore veſted in, or " lawfully exerciſed by, the ſaid Court of " Directors, *hereby diſcontinued*, or Pro- " prietors, or by the General Court of Pro- " prietors," to *ſeven* Directors, who were not to be choſen by the Proprietors, for whoſe intereſt they were to be ſuppoſed to act; the Bill, however, declared, that theſe powers were to be ſubject to ſuch reſtrictions and limitations as by this act ſhould be provided or directed. What were the *reſtrictions* or *limitations* which this act *did* provide?

provide? I have attentively ſought for them, and can find nothing but *extenſion* of power and *amplification* of patronage, wherever the regulations of this Bill deviate from the powers and authorities hitherto veſted in the General Court of Proprietors, and Court of Directors.

The Proprietors have now authority to chuſe and appoint twenty-four Directors for the management of their political and commercial concerns, who are to continue in their office for four years, with a ſucceſſive change of ſix who every year go out of the Direction by ſeniority, and are ſucceeded by ſix new Directors, choſen by a General Court of Proprietors. The Bill propoſed by Mr. Fox, was to have appointed nine aſſiſtant Directors "for the *ſole* purpoſe "of ordering and managing the *commerce* of "the ſaid Company," allowing, however, the Proprietors of India ſtock, to elect a ſucceſſor to any vacancy which might happen by death, removal, or otherwiſe, but giving at the ſame time, an unlimited and uncontrouled power to the *ſeven* Directors,

of removing *ad libitum* any one or more of the aſſiſtant Directors, acting under them, for the regulation of the *commercial* intereſts of the Company: by this regulation, the Proprietors of India Stock would have been deprived of that privilege which every Engliſhman has a right to poſſeſs, of intruſting the *management* of his *private property* to thoſe, whoſe knowledge, abilities, or integrity, he has experienced, or can confide in; for in this caſe, the management of the greateſt collective commercial property in Europe, would have been veſted, in the firſt inſtance, in the hands of men, not anſwerable to the owners of that property for their conduct, not choſen by them, not even offered to their approbation, or ſubject to their negative; and leaſt the ſhadow of their departed rights of election, (which the appointment to any vacancy which might happen amongſt the original nine Directors gave them,) ſhould bear any appearance of freedom, or confer any power to elude the jealous graſp of miniſterial influence, by the poſſible introduction of

any

any independant aſſiſtant Directors; the ancient eſtabliſhed mode of election by ballot, was to have been abrogated, and a book opened, in which a Proprietor with any proſpect, or hope of employment for himſelf or any of his connections, muſt be raſh and inconſiderate indeed, to venture to record his refractorineſs by ſigning his name, as voting for a candidate obnoxious to, or *not recommended* by the Miniſter; yet even the exertion of this right, were it more ſubſtantial, would have placed any proſpect of poſſible advantage to the intereſts of the Proprietors, at a very great diſtance—for the death, or removal of *five* Directors at leaſt muſt happen, before they could have even a *ſuppoſed* confidence in, or *probable* expectation of any regard to their intereſts, from thoſe aſſiſtant Directors; but to what muſt that confidence and thoſe expectations be reduced, when theſe eventual objects of their choice, theſe men of their controuled election, would have been liable "to be diſmiſſed, for the diſobe-"dience of any order or orders they might "receive," from a Court of Directors,

who, reſpectable as they may be, for their private integrity and abilities, were, to ſay the leaſt of them, ignorant of commerce, and unacquainted with the true intereſts of the India Proprietors, either in Europe or in India; though it muſt be confeſſed, they were admirably choſen, for the purpoſe of veſting the whole of the enormous patronage of that country in the hands of the Coalition which was to create them, as the names of the moſt powerful connections, and thoſe of the neareſt relations and moſt devoted adherents of the coaleſcing Parties compoſed the Liſt.

The dominion of the Court of Directors propoſed by this Bill, was not, however, to have been confined to the ſpecious power of diſmiſſing the Members of a ſubordinate Board acting immediately under them; it was further to be enacted, "that the "Directors, or the major part of them, "ſhould have full power and authority to "remove, diſplace, ſuſpend, *appoint*, con-"firm, or *reſtore* all and every perſon from "or to any office, ſtation, or capacity what-"ſoever,

" ſoever, civil or military, in the ſervice of " the ſaid United Company, or within the " limits of the ſaid United Company's " Charters, or any of them, or any way " concerned in the management of their " affairs within this Kingdom or in India, " whether any ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall " have been nominated or appointed, in " and by any Act, or any Acts of Parlia- " ment, or howſoever nominated or ap- " pointed." Here the Bill appears in its true colours, points to its true objects, and lays open its only effectual tendency: Patronage; immediate, ample, unconditional, unbounded Patronage! No ſpecious precaution of reaſons to be inſerted in the minutes of their proceedings, is here provided; all appointments by Act of Parliament or otherwiſe, whether civil or military, from a Governor-general to a Writer, from a Commander in Chief to a Cadet, were to be ſubject to their power of immediate removal, without any motive but their intereſt or inclination; without any controul but their moderation and conſciences; what could have reſiſted the powerful diſpoſal of ſuch an immenſe Patronage of em-

ployments

ployments and places! nevertheleſs, more was thought neceſſary "to make aſſurance double ſure."

One ſhould have imagined that the excluſive diſpoſal of Governments, military commands, commiſſariats, contracts, ſhipping, with the innumerable branches which ſpread out from thoſe great Stems of influence and patronage, would have been ſufficient to ſatisfy rapacious and ambitious men of any precedented inordinancy; but not ſatisfied with depriving the Proprietors of Eaſt India Stock of the right they enjoy by the conſtitution of the country, and the contract of their Charter, to chooſe thoſe, to whom they would delegate the *management* of their commercial concerns, and to whom they would confide places of the higheſt truſt, and of the moſt eſſential conſequence to their property; by this Bill, that very property was to have been wreſted out of their hands, their ſhips, books, warehouſes, merchandiſe, was to be ſeized upon, and committed to the uncontrouled management of men, who had no intereſt in their concerns, no knowledge of their affairs

affairs, and no reſponſibility to them, or indeed to any body: the Directors were, it is true, to offer their books, for the inſpection of the Proprietors every ſix months; but to what purpoſe could be this exhibition of accounts, before perſons, to whom they were not amenable, whoſe diſapprobation would be as impotent as their applauſe would be futile; for the Directors could only have been removed before the end of their commiſſion, by an addreſs from a Parliament to whom they would have had the power of diſtributing two millions per annum! Such a proviſion for the removal of the Directors was an inſult on the deſigned impotency of the Eaſt India Company: The premature influence of ſuch a Bill, is the beſt warning of its dangerous tendency, what is to be expected from the experienced enjoyments of its corrupting ſweets, when the bare hopes of its untaſted benefits could carry it through one branch of the legiſlature!

When I ſee charters violated; a Power exerciſed over the perſons and intereſts of thoſe who did not delegate it; and the property

property ſeized which has not been forfeited; I ſhudder at the powers which I have hitherto revered; and whilſt I rejoice at the timely and glorious interpoſition of one branch of the Legiſlature, which has ſaved us from the precipice, I cannot help looking with horror into the abyſs of wretchedneſs and ſlavery to which we ſhall fall, if ever the omnipotence of the conſtitution ſhould be ſtretched to the verge of its power, and ſink into tyranny.

Had this Bill paſſed into a law, the Conſtitution would have been deſtroyed by the raſhneſs of the Legiſlature; a new executive power raiſed above the controul of the Crown, fixed by the Parliament to a period beyond its own exiſtence; armed with an independence of the prerogative of diſmiſſion, which the Parliament itſelf does not poſſeſs; and inveſted with the boundleſs patronage and meaſureleſs riches of the Eaſt, would have ſtarted up at once too formidable for ſufferance, and too powerful for reſiſtance; a conteſt would have immediately taken place between the old conſtitutional executive power of the Crown, and this new

monſter

monſter of executive ariſtocracy: the Crown, whoſe ſplendour by exciting jealouſy takes from its power, would probably have fallen the victim of the more vigorous though leſs glaring influence of the rich and powerful ariſtocracy it oppoſed (if the inſtruments of one great conſtituent and directing man deſerve that name;) but whichſoever gained the aſcendancy the victory muſt have been deſtructive to the Conſtitution, and calamitous to the Nation; for my own part I cannot heſitate to decide, and do not ſcruple to declare, that of the two dreadful calamities, one of which muſt have enſued, I ſhould prefer ſlaviſh uncertainty under an unlimited monarchy, to the ſelfiſh tyranny and rapacity exerted by a powerful ariſtocracy; yet ſubjection to the latter would probably have been the fate of this country, had Mr. Fox's Eaſt India Bill paſſed into a law, and his commiſſioners obtained their aſſured exiſtence to a period beyond that at which this Parliament muſt terminate. The riches of the Eaſt, and the influence of its patronage (the *whole* of which, as I have before ſtated, this Bill would have given the Directors a power of vacating and

conferring at their pleaſure,) muſt have enſured ſuch a Parliament, after the general election, as would have acted in whatever manner the framer of this Bill ſhould pleaſe to direct; implicitly ſeconding his views, adopting his meaſures, and executing his orders: The outward form of the old conſtitution would have ſcreened the encroachments of his power, till he had extended it to ſuch a degree of exceſs and ſtrength, that he could, as it ſuited his intereſt, inclination, or ambition, either continue to exhibit, or finally cruſh the empty ſhell of the old form of Government.

It has been urged that the independence of the ſeven Directors is not new to the Conſtitution, and the ſituation of the twelve Judges has been adduced as a proof of the aſſertion; but a very few words will be ſufficient to point out the different nature and tendency of a judicial, or an executive authority independent of the Crown. The Judges are bound to adhere in their deciſions to the common or ſtatute laws of the kingdom, which deciſions are upon proof of error liable to be reverſed by an

appeal

appeal to one of the branches of the Legiſlature; but the ſeven Directors propoſed by Mr. Fox's Eaſt India Bill, unguided by laws, uncontrouled by appeals, were to have made the regulations by which they ſhould act, "and bid their will avouch it;" they were not conſtituted for the deciſion, but for the aſſumption of property; they were not diſintereſtedly to determine between thoſe who applied to them for judgment, but to govern thoſe who proteſted againſt their exiſtence; they were not (like the Judges) to decide points to which the long and abſtruſe ſtudy of a learned profeſſion was excluſively competent, and in which their eminence made them peculiarly excellent; they were to undertake the excluſive management of commercial concerns, in which they had no experience; and the unlimited government of an extenſive country, of which they had no knowledge; they were to unite a power of territory, an influence of patronage, and weight of wealth within themſelves, which could only be ſafe to the country and conſtitution, from the great numbers and divided intereſts of

the Eaſt-India Proprietors; in ſhort, the parallel of the judges and of the propoſed Eaſt-India Directors, reduces itſelf to this concluſion, that the independence of the firſt is neceſſary to the ſecurity of individuals and their property; the independence of the laſt muſt have been ſubverſive of the rights, and deſtructive to the liberties of the whole people. Having conſidered the miſchiefs which would have ariſen from this Bill to the conſtitution at *Home*, I will proceed to examine how far its operation would have tended to remove or correct the evils which exiſt in the government of our territorial poſſeſſions in *India*.

To remedy the complaint which has been made, that the great property of the delinquent ſervants of the Company in India, gave them too much weight and influence in the General Courts, by whom they were to be judged, this Bill was to have veſted the whole power of taking cognizance of crimes, and judging culprits in the new Court of Directors, who were to begin their examination, " twenty days

" after

" after the receipt of any accuſation or of-
" ficial account of diſputes between the
" Governors and their reſpective Councils,
" or between the government of one ſet-
" tlement and the government of another
" ſettlement, &c." and were to come to a *definitive* deciſion within three months, or give their reaſons for *not* having done ſo; it further provided, that no perſon accuſed of a crime in India, ſhould be continued in a place of power or truſt, unleſs the Court of Directors find ſuch charge to be groundleſs, or *not of ſufficient importance to exclude the ſaid perſon from the ſaid office.* To perſons determined to do juſtice, " for truth's ſake, and their conſcience," no regulations are neceſſary; to men aiming at power, graſping at influence, and greedy of patronage, theſe regulations would be peculiarly favourable: I do not mean to caſt any imputation upon the particular men who were propoſed for the offices of Directors or Commiſſioners, many of them are of the moſt reſpectable characters, but ſuch is the general depravity of human nature, that miſconduct, ambition and venality, muſt be provided againſt

in

in all human regulations of policy and power; and whilſt we are endeavouring to cancel and diſpel the exiſting evils in India, we muſt not hazard the growth of greater inconveniencies at home: if we ſhould for a moment ſuppoſe the new Court of Directors, ſurrounded with needy, clamorous, and rapacious dependants, ſhould we ſuppoſe them eager to exert their powers, and provide for their croud of followers and their numerous families; could any thing be more amply adapted to their purpoſes, than the proviſions I have already cited from the Bill? In twenty days after the receipt of any accuſation or complaint they are to begin examination, and to proceed to *definitive* judgment before the end of three months, or give their reaſons for *not* having done ſo—no reaſon is required for their *having* come to any deciſion they pleaſe; it is therefore at their option to give a *definitive* judgment upon partial accuſations, ſupported by *ex parte* evidence, which publiſhed, will give a ſpecious reaſon for the recall of any official perſon, from the higheſt to the loweſt, in India; and this judgment, except on extra-

ordinary

ordinary occaſions, is to be given within three months, a ſpace of time which various accidents may make the difference of paſſage between two ſhips, quitting India nearly at the ſame time, the one bringing the refutation, the other the charges: Suppoſing all the preſent great offices in India ſo vacated, and filled by the needy dependents I have hypothetically deſcribed, the queſtion will naturally be aſked, Whether theſe officers may not be removed as their predeceſſors were? No. For if one can ſuppoſe partiality or favour to exiſt in the breaſts of the ſeven Directors, or any four of them, any charge may "appear to them *not of ſufficient importance* to exclude the ſaid perſon from the ſaid office;" and if it could be ſuppoſed that an immenſe acquiſition of wealth by the perſons nearly connected with, or formerly dependent upon them, would have equal influence on theſe ſeven Directors, as the ſame power of wealth acquired by men who from inferior offices, in the Company's ſervice, had upon the whole collective body of Proprietors, what a terrible ſcene of

increaſed

increaſed peculation, what an unprecedented (even in thoſe countries) exceſs of ſcreened villainy, and fearleſs oppreſſion, might we look forward to, from a new ſwarm of hungry adventurers, ſent to ſucceed the preſent leeches, who nearly filled, ſuck ſlowly, and without exertion, from that long lacerated and bleeding country! yet the worſt that imagination can frame, would, (under Directors or Commiſſioners, corruptible in themſelves, or ſurrounded and influenced by needy dependants have been the probable conſequences) of the unbounded diſcretion of haſty condemnation, or the arbitrary appreciation of the importance and nature of ſpecified and ſubſtantiated crimes, which would have been delegated to them; ſuch a Bill appointing Commiſſioners with the ordinary frailties of human nature, ought properly to be entitled, *An Act for the greater oppreſſion of the Natives of India, and for the more ſpeedy diſſolution of our commercial concerns and territorial poſſeſſions in that country.*

I will

I will now proceed to the conſideration of the Bill for the better government and management of the affairs of the Eaſt-India Company, which was propoſed by Mr. Pitt, and thrown out by the Houſe of Commons, on the queſtion for the ſecond reading of it, by a majority of eight votes, on Friday the 23d of January. Had the majority been more conſiderable, I ſhould with greater diffidence and heſitation have expreſſed my opinion of this Bill, but with ſo nearly one half of the Houſe of Commons in favour of an Act, which would have aſſumed no patronage, and conſequently held forth no hopes of perſonal advantage, or emolument to thoſe who ſhould ſupport it, I feel no ſcruple to declare, that I think it was a Bill, which, with the grace of moderation, appeared to poſſeſs the excellence of efficacy; it gave interference, without influence, to the Crown, and veſted in the Government of this country the power of correction, and controul in India, unbiaſſed by motives of intereſt, or the exertion of patronage; it was a brilliant inſtance of the unequalled abi-

ſities, and characteriſtic diſintereſtedneſs and moderation of the Right Honourable framer of the Bill; to give the power of removal from offices without the privilege of appointing officers; to leave the choice of able and experienced men to thoſe who know the nature of the buſineſs to be undertaken, and the talents and knowledge of thoſe appointed to execute it, and to veſt the power of recall in the Government, who were competent to judge of the conduct of thoſe officers, and of the conſequences likely to reſult from it to the benefit, or detriment of the nation at large.—But the Bill deſerves minute inveſtigation, and will, I believe, appear in the moſt favourable light, from being ſubjected to the moſt accurate examination. The firſt eſſential object of attention in the tranſactions and regulations of the Eaſt-India Company, is the effect they will have on the revenue of this nation, and the political concerns of this country in Europe; a board of Commiſſioners was therefore propoſed in this Bill, who ſhould "be fully authorized and "impowered, from time to time, to check,

"ſuperintend,

" ſuperintend, and controul all Acts, opera-
" tions, and concerns, which in any wiſe
" relate to the *civil* or *military* GOVERN-
" MENT, or *revenues* of the territories and
" poſſeſſions of the ſaid United Company,
" in the Eaſt-Indies;"—here we ſee the real objects ſeized upon, which call for the interpoſition of Goverment, the *territorial* concerns, the civil and military tranſactions, and the revenue arrangements of the Company, not the private property and commercial regulations of the mere mercantile Members of this great chartered body. No miſmanagement of commerce could be of ſo dangerous a tendency, as to require ſuch violent meaſures, as an arbitrary aſſumption of the property of the Merchants—*Quid meruere . . . . animal ſine fraude doliſque, innocuum, ſimplex, natum tolerare labores.*

But to return to the Bill—the Board of Commiſſioners, as here conſtituted, would have been peculiarly adapted to the objects for which it was appointed; the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State, having officially the moſt accu-

rate information, and the moſt extenſive knowledge of every point of revenue, or policy, which could be influenced or affected by the tranſactions in India; the other Commiſſioners being of his Majeſty's Privy Council, would probably have been choſen, as men of eminent abilities, extenſive knowledge, and in ſituations of truſt and importance in the Government; to this Board of Commiſſioners, all the diſpatches received by the Court of Directors of the Eaſt-India Company, were to be ſubmitted, "together with all minutes, orders, reſolu-"tions, and other proceedings of all Ge-"neral and Special Courts of Proprietors of "the ſaid Company;" by theſe means, with the right of acceſs to all papers and muniments of the Company, which this Bill was to have given to the Commiſſioners; they would have poſſeſſed all the neceſſary, and indeed, all the poſſible general knowledge of the tranſactions in India, to be acquired at this diſtance; and have been fully competent to examine, and decide upon the expediency and propriety of "all "letters, orders, and inſtructions whatſo-

"ever,

" ever, relating to the civil government, or " revenues of the Britiſh territorial poſ- " ſeſſions in the Eaſt-Indies, propoſed to " be ſent or diſpatched by the Court of " Directors of the United Company," which were by this Act to have been ſubmitted to the inſpection, and entirely ſubject to the deciſion, orders, and direction, of the Board of Commiſſioners; thus without interfering with the minute arrangements of detail in India, they would have been able to decide upon all great meaſures, and to prevent the beginning, or ſtop the progreſs of any which ſhould appear dangerous to the intereſts, or inconvenient to the policy of this country; for the local expediency of any purſuit in India, muſt be a ſecondary conſideration, and can no longer be eligible, when it in any reſpect counteracts, or interferes with the intereſts or views of this country in Europe; therefore the deciſions of the Board of Commiſſioners were to have been concluſive; and, " the ſaid Court of " Directors were thereupon to diſpatch and " ſend the letters, orders, and inſtructions " ſo approved or amended, to their ſervants

" in

" in India without further delay, and no " letters, orders, or inſtructions, until *after* " ſuch previous communication thereof to " the ſaid Board, were to be at any time " ſent or diſpatched by the ſaid Court of " Directors to the Eaſt-Indies, on any ac- " count or pretence whatſover."

By theſe regulations the Government of the Britiſh territorial poſſeſſions in India, would have been, as heretofore, carried on by thoſe who beſt underſtood, and were moſt intereſted in the management of them; a check was to have been kept over that Government; and a controul over that management was to be lodged in the hands of the Miniſters of the Crown, to confine the individual intereſts and ſeparate objects of the Eaſt India Company, within the limits preſcribed by the general policy and public proſperity of the nation at large; yet, in the midſt of theſe neceſſary and rigid regulations for the civil and military government of *territorial poſſeſſions*, the framer of the Bill, ſcrupulouſly tender of the chartered rights of merchants, cautious of invading

ing private property, and aware of the dangerous conſequences of ſhackling trade, which cannot exiſt without indulgence, or flouriſh under conſtraint, had further provided by the act, "that in caſe the ſaid "board ſhould ſend any orders or inſtruc-"tions, which in the opinion of the ſaid "Court of Directors relate to points not "connected with the civil or military go-"vernment, and revenues of the ſaid terri-"tories and poſſeſſions in India, then, and "in any ſuch caſe, it ſhall be lawful for "the ſaid Court of Directors, to apply by "petition to his Majeſty in Council, touch-"ing ſuch orders and inſtructions, and his "Majeſty in Council ſhall decide, whether "the ſame be, or be not connected with "the civil or military government and re-"venues of the ſaid territories in India, "which deciſion ſhall be final and con-"cluſive." By this regulation the Court of Directors would have had an opportunity of ſtating their objections to ſuch orders and inſtructions, not only before the Board of Commiſſioners, but to his Majeſty and the remainder of the Council; if it ſtill appeared

peared that the orders and inſtructions related to objects in the management of which the nation at large were concerned, the deciſion was to be concluſive; and the wiſhes and opinions of intereſted individuals muſt have given way to the purſuit of general advantage.

The appointment of a commander in chief in all or any of the preſidencies or ſettlements in the Eaſt Indies, to have voice and precedence in the Council immediatley after the Governor or Preſident, was by the act to have been veſted in the Crown; becauſe the appointment of a General officer from the King's ſervice would make him more immediately ſubject to the inſtructions and directions of the government at home, for the proſecution of a war, in which the intereſts and proſperity of the whole nation muſt neceſſarily be involved; and becauſe the co-operation of his Majeſty fleets muſt be ever better arranged, and more ſatisfactory conducted, when the commanders by ſea and land act under the ſame authority, and are appointed through the ſame channels:

nels: I could urge many more reaſons for the neceſſity of this ſingle appointment to have been veſted in the Crown by this act, if I did not apprehend that they might be conſidered as invidious; or, if I did not conceive them to be unneceſſary to prove the expediency and propriety of this regulation: all other appointments of Governor General, Governors, Preſidents, and members of Councils; in ſhort, to all places of whatſoever nature, degree, or denomination, was to be left in the hands of the Court of Directors, and Proprietors of Eaſt India Stock; ſubject, however, to removal or recall by order in writing, under the King's Sign Manual, counterſigned by the Secretary of State, a copy of the order in ſuch a recall or removal being tranſmitted to the Chairman or Deputy-Chairman of the Court of Directors; who were to nominate and appoint a fit perſon or perſons to ſupply ſuch vacancy or vacancies; to be approved by his Majeſty; or if not approved by him, the ſaid Court were to proceed to nominate or appoint ſome other perſon or perſons, ſubject as before to the approbation or diſallowance of his Majeſty: by leaving the

nomination to all offices with the Court of Directors, the Miniſters of the Crown having no ſhare in the appointment, and no part of the patronage, could have no inducement from connection to ſcreen the miſconduct of delinquents, nor any motive of intereſt to tempt them to remove the deſerving and diligent ſervants of the Company from their offices in India; their attention would probably have been directed to the real merits of the Company's ſervants; and the power of removal or recall, have been only exerted for the purpoſes of juſtice, the prevention of evils, or the puniſhment of crimes; the Eaſt-India Company would have had confidence in the zeal and abilities of thoſe they had themſelves choſen; and the Governors and other officers abroad would be cautious in their conduct, from a knowledge that thoſe whoſe favour had appointed them to their offices, had not the power of continuing them in their ſituations; and that a rapacious acquiſition of wealth might excite the envy and clamours of thoſe who were no longer poſſeſſed of the powers, which elſe it might

have influenced to protect them; whilſt the diſallowance given to the Crown of the perſons choſen by the Directors to ſucceed to any vacancy, would exclude peculators from an election to any other place, which on any future occaſion the influence of their wealth might have ſecured to them: Such an equipoiſe between the divided powers of appointment and removal, would have (as far as human prudence can provide againſt human depravity) ſecured zeal and moderation in all who had prudence and judgment to ſee their real intereſt, or at leaſt have provided unreſtrained and immediate juſtice againſt thoſe who gave way to temptation, or betrayed their truſt. As a further barrier againſt the operation of any undue influence over the Court of Directors of the Eaſt-India Company, and to prevent the delays of chicane and contrivance, at the election of a perſon to fill any office that might become vacant, it was provided by the act, that, if within a ſtated period the Court of Directors had not filled up the vacant office, it ſhall be lawful for his Majeſty to appoint, under his ſign manual, a ſucceſſor to fill

the vacaut office. When I conſider the whole of this Bill, I am equally aſtoniſhed at the comprehenſive ſyſtem of powerful controul, over the conduct of the Eaſt-India Company and their ſervants, in every point relative to their civil and military government, and in all operations and concerns relative to the *territorial poſſeſſions* and *revenues* in the Eaſt Indies; and at the ſtudious forbearance of any aſſumption of Patronage or influence; the ſcrupulous attention to the ſacredneſs of property, the rigid regard for the commercial rights of a chartered Company, and the noble contempt of illicit power, and unjuſtifiable violence, which marks this Bill in contradiſtinction to that of Mr. Fox, would have made it an honour to the legiſlature had it paſſed; it is not for me to decide what concluſion is to be drawn from its rejection.

Having entered ſo minutely into the principles and tendency of the two Bills propoſed by Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, for the regulation of our affairs in India, it will be ſcarcely neceſſary to draw any other charac-

ter

ter of either than the nature of their reſpective Bills will paint; yet, that no means in my power may be wanting to awaken my countrymen to a ſenſe of the deep ſtake they have on the event which is to terminate the preſent arduous political conteſt between theſe two great men, I will endeavour to draw their characters, according to the opinion I have formed of each: perſonally a ſtranger to both, having never received any favour or offence from either of them, I cannot be ſuppoſed to be influenced by partiality or reſentment; the diſtinguiſhing points of their characters have ſtruck me ſtrongly; I ſhall deſcribe them as I feel them; and leave the juſtneſs and truth of my delineation, to be decided upon by the judicious and diſpaſſionate obſervers of political tranſactions.

To do juſtice to the political character of a ſtateſman, it is neceſſary, in ſome meaſure, to trace the progreſs of his political life. No man ever united in himſelf a greater extent of brilliant, dangerous, and powerful qualities

qualities of the underſtanding than the Right Honourable Gentleman who propoſed the firſt Bill, which I have conſidered in this pamphlet; able, artful, eloquent, judicious, daring, and indefatigable, he began his public life at an early period, with the complicated qualities of an eager voluptuary, and a zealous politician; he united the unremitted enjoyments of a man of pleaſure with the ever preſent proſpect of future greatneſs, and unbounded power; where he could make the two purſuits compatible, he made the firſt ſubſervient to the laſt, and enjoyed their union; where they claſhed he was ſtill mindful that pleaſure was but a tranſient occupation, and that ambition was his great purſuit; he therefore invariably ſacrificed his temporary inclination to his ultimate object. By the disjunction of political connections, and diſunion of family intereſts, he has formed a band of devoted adherents, who are the obſcure attendants of his various tranſitions from precarious power to factitious popularity. Steady to the purſuit of his object; indifferent about the means of its attainment;

unembarraſſed by his connections; unreſtrained by animoſity; we have ſeen him at one time the virulent adverſary, at another, the pledged aſſociate of the ſame man; active, ingenious, and clamorous, in oppoſition to Government; enterpriſing, inconſiderate, and determined as a Miniſter—a formidable adverſary and refractory colleague; he would ſoon be every thing he could aim to attain, and more than would be ſafe to the country, if his judgment and foreſight were equal to his quickneſs and reſource; or that his perſeverance was tempered with prudence, and his enterprize moderated to probability—the means by which he laſt made his way to power, and the meaſures by which he endeavoured to preſerve it, are glaring inſtances of his violent efforts and monſtrous reſources; having long ſtruggled unſucceſsfully, but ever indefatigably, for admiſſion to power, he at length ſucceeded in diminiſhing the influence of the Crown, which he (not without reaſon) conſidered as *one* of the great obſtacles to the attainment of his object, but the diminution of the powers of

Government

Government which enabled him to ſeize the direction of it, made him at the ſame time inſecure in the poſſeſſion of his power; to have reſtored the influence of the Crown, would have been to enſure his immediate diſmiſſion, and future excluſion from any ſhare in the Government; ſome other mode was therefore to be adopted for the aſſurance of his ſituation; the affairs of India required the interpoſition of Government, for their better regulation; his imagination, quick and fertile in expedients, immediately ſuggeſted the means of turning this occurrence to the attainment of his object, but the impetuoſity of his diſpoſition, and the exceſs of his ſpirit of enterprize, urged him to attempt the aſſumption of inaſſailable, inſtead of confining himſelf to the poſſeſſion of well eſtabliſhed power; with theſe proſpects, and for theſe purpoſes, his Eaſt-India Bill was introduced into the Houſe of Commons—it paſſed—but the Lords, alarmed at the appearance of a Bill, which ſo evidently tended to overturn the Conſtitution of this Country, without ſeeming calculated to ſettle the Government

vernment of India, rejected it; and his Majeſty diſmiſſed Mr. F. from his councils.—The choice of the Crown for a Miniſter to ſucceed him, was fixed where the wiſhes and expectations of the country had alſo turned; on Mr. Pitt,—a young man of abilities, at leaſt equal in extent to thoſe of Mr. Fox, but very different in their nature—Educated to politics from his infancy, by a father, whoſe integrity and abilities made him an honour to human nature, and a bleſſing to his country; the date of Mr. Pitt's political life muſt be placed at a period long previous to his public appearance, for at his firſt entrance into Parliament, he burſt from the cloud of adoleſcence, in the full meridian of brilliant eloquence, ſolid information, and extenſive knowledge; proof againſt the allurements of vice, above the trifling enjoyments of youthful follies, with a ſpotleſs character, an unbroken conſtitution and undivided attention, he devoted himſelf to the ſervice of his country; his ſubſtantial reaſoning, and faultleſs eloquence, pointed him out almoſt immediately as an object worthy of the moſt ſerious attention of all parties: on a change

of Adminiſtration, a place of truſt and conſequence was offered to him; ſteady, cool, diſpaſſionate, and judicious, he determined not to engage himſelf to any party, till he had tried and proved their principles; in anſwer to theſe offers, I have been told, that he declined accepting any place, declaring that he entertained a good opinion of the Adminiſtration then forming; and, "would watch over them with "a friendly eye."—At the death of the late Marquis of Rockingham, a ſtruggle enſued for the firſt Poſt in Adminiſtration; the unſucceſsful party, without any pretext of varied meaſures, without any pretended diſcovery of altered principles, quitted the Adminiſtration on their diſappointment; ſuch a ſeceſſion ſeemed to forebode the downfall of the Miniſtry; but Mr. Pitt ſtept forth to their ſupport, and promiſed to abide by them as long as they adhered to their principles and conduct; the diſadvantageous peace, which unavoidably cloſed an unſucceſsful war, occaſioned the removal of that Adminiſtration: the hiſtory of ſubſequent ſtruggles for power, and the Coalition arrangementsa re foreign to my preſent

ſent object, as they are unconnected with the character of Mr. Pitt, till the meaſures of that Coalition became the inſtrument to ſhew him, once more ſtepping forward at a moment of difficulty and embarraſſment, to ſhield the Prerogative of the Crown, the Privileges of the People, and the Conſtitution of the Country, from the encroachments of ariſtocratic innovations: at firſt he ſtood alone and unſupported, the *only* champion of the inſulted country; but ſoon his ſteady firmneſs ſpread its influence to the breaſts of others, and he has hitherto been enabled to ſtand againſt the vigorous efforts of a powerful faction; ſupported as he is, by the Corporation of the City of London, and by the body of Merchants, who have been witneſſes of the late many ſtrange political tranſactions; eminent for the unfluctuating principles of his public conduct, and ſcrupulouſly anxious for the true intereſts and real proſperity of his country, he has foreborne to adviſe a diſſolution of Parliament,—he has offered a Bill, framed, *bona fide*, for the better government of India; unſtained by the violation of

charters, and ſeizure of property, unclogged by glaring innovations on the Conſtitution, and a rapacious aſſumption of unbounded Patronage; yet this Bill has been rejected by the Houſe of Commons, and leave has been given for Mr. Fox to bring in another Bill: are then the eſſential concerns of the Eaſt Indies to be neglected by alternate rejections of different Bills in each Houſe of Parliament? or is it rather to he wiſhed that Mr. Fox's Bill ſhould paſs into a law, at the expence of the conſtitution, and to the excluſion of every man but himſelf and his adherents, from the adminiſtration of affairs? The queſtion is not now, whether it is a pleaſing or agreeable meaſure to diſſolve the Parliament, but whether it is not more deſirable and more beneficial to the nation to ſuffer *that* inconvenience, than either to leave the affairs of the Britiſh territories in India in confuſion, or to ſee an executive ariſtocracy independent of the Crown eſtabliſhed by act of Parliament, charters cancelled, and private property ſequeſtered? Why does not the corporation of the city London, who have addreſſed the

the King, to expreſs their gratitude for the removal of his Majeſty's late miniſters from his Councils, now petition him to exert his prerogative to ſecure their excluſion from them? the ſtruggle muſt ſoon come to a deciſion; let the people of England beware of the event; for if it ends in the removal of the preſent firſt miniſter, unblamed for any error, untried by any meaſure, I know not where there will be found a man to ſupply his place, who will poſſeſs his candour, integrity, judgment, ability and moderation; and who will ſo juſtly poſſeſs, and ſo eminently deſerve the confidence of the people of England.

FINIS.

BEAUTIES of FOX, NORTH and BURKE,

This Day is Published, Price 3s. 6d.

Embellished with a Beautiful Frontispiece of those remarkable Characters, taken from the Life by an eminent Artist:

Together with an ADDRESS to the PUBLIC, and a SERIES of FACTS to the FRIENDS of the COALITION.

Printed for J. STOCKDALE, opposite Burlington-House, Piccadilly.

With a copious INDEX to the whole, in the Course of which, the undermentioned Charges appear exchanged between Lord North, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Burke, and arranged under the following Heads:

Lord NORTH

charged with a Want of Candour and Conscience 1
threatened with Vengeance —— 2
his general Conduct arraigned —— 3
accused of Treachery and falsehood —— 3
is charged with Negligence and Incapacity — 3
accused of Rashness —— —— 4
charges Mr. Fox with indiscriminate Censure — 4
arraigned on leading the House blindfold —— 4
thinks it proper to arm the Roman Chatholics — 4
is of Opinion, that the Dispute with America will end speedily, happily, and without bloodshed — 5
a great deal of Laughter raised at his Expence 5
described as a blundering Pilot —— 5
charged with the Loss of a whole Continent — 5
pronounced a *Tory*, and an Enemy to Freedom 5
said to have spent more in disgracing the Nation, than Lord Chatham in spreading a Lustre around it 5

holds

holds the Contempt and Pity of Mr. Fox in equal Indifference —— —— 6
his Conduct reſpecting the American War arraigned 6
his political Apoſtles compared to Our Saviour's 6
charged with Breach of Promiſe —— 7, 32
never twice in the ſame Temper, or of the ſame Opinion 7
ſuſpected of being bribed —— —— 7
his Conduct pronounced inſolent and contemptuous 7
charged with having rendered a Four Shilling Land-Tax perpetual —— —— 8
threatened to be made reſponſible for all his Meaſures 8
accuſed of the Deſign of ſpreading arbitrary Power throughout the Empire —— 9
charged with Inſolence and Temerity —— 10
—— with being credulous —— 10
the Houſe alarmed at his views —— —— 10
accuſed of Indecency and Impropriety —— 10
menaced with a Day of Reckoning —— 11
compared to Sir Robert Walpole for Corruption; and charged with having loſt Half the Empire by it 11
brings a heavy charge againſt Mr. Fox —— 12
charged with Indignity and Vileneſs —— 12
accuſed of Puſillanimity —— —— 12
cenſured for ſuſpending the Habeas Corpus Act 12
compared to *Sancho Panza*'s Phyſician —— 13
likened to Doctor Sangrado —— 13
the Capture of Gen. Burgoyne imputed to his ignorance 14
threatened with an enquiry into it —— 15
charged with a remarkable inſtance of Silline ſs — 15
a very ſingular way of recovering America aſcribed to him —— —— 15
accuſed of Impotence, Obſtinacy, Incapacity, and Inattention —— —— 16
repreſented as ſuſpected, deteſted, and deſpiſed by America —— —— 17
accuſed of raiſing Men without the Knowledge of Parliament —— —— 17
reminds Mr. Burke of Pericles —— 18
threatened with an inveſtigation into his conduct 18
pronounced the contriver of our misfortunes — 19
charges Mr. Fox with having gone very near ſpeaking Treaſon —— —— 19
ridiculed by Mr. Fox — 19, 26, 57, 59, 63
—— by Mr. Burke —— 61, 72
his employing the Indians ſeverely reprobated 19
denies any War can break out with France —— 20

pronounced

pronounced deſerving an Axe — 20, 35
charged with being the *laſt* to learn what he ſhould be the *firſt* to know — — 26
accuſed of having betrayed the Nation — 20
charged with Ignorance reſpecting the Toulon Fleet 21
ridiculed by Mr. Burke — — 21
charged, in the moſt direct terms, with the Loſs of America — — 21
Mr. Fox declares he will never act with him — 22
cenſured reſpecting Admiral Keppel — 23
accuſed of Avarice and Ambition — 23
charged with Partiality — — 24
compared with the Miniſter of Xerxes — 25
his views pronounced diſhoneſt and corrupt — 27
accuſed of wanting to throw off all Reſponſibility 28
puts Mr. Burke in mind of a Story of Sir Godfrey Kneller — — 30
detected aſleep — — 31
charged with an Act of public Perfidy — 31
accuſed of contemning the People of England — 31
Mr. Fox thinks it would have been better he had never been born — — 33
Mr. Burke talks of impeaching him — 35
Mr. Fox diſdains the idea of joining him — 37
declares he has not bettered his Fortune a ſingle Shilling 37
pronounced impertinent and inſulting — 37
the illegal Army of Ireland raiſed through his bad conduct — — 38
Mr. Burke denies he will ever be able to take him by the *Paw* — — 38
would rather have Mr. Fox for an *Opponent* than *Comentator* — — 39
accuſed of acting in direct contradiction to all honeſt and diſhoneſt Politicians that ever lived — — 40
Mr. Fox alarmed at his conduct towards the Eaſt India Company — — 40
his ſyſtem condemned — — 42
Mr. Burke reprobates his conduct to Ireland 43
his contract with Mr. Atkinſon for Rum ſeverely cenſured — — — 43
what his Country Gentlemen are — 44
affronts the Navy and the Army — 45
pronounced full of Blunders, &c. — 46
Mr. Burke denies his right to meddle with the India Company's territorial acquiſitions — 47, 48

his

LORD NORTH.

his conduct in ſending Commiſſioners to America to treat for peace — — — 51, 52
attacked for his abuſe of his Loans — — 52
charged with avarice and ambition — — 54
Indolence and Ignorance 57
his reaſons for continuing the American war aſſigned 54
accuſed of Robbery — — — 55
his mode of calling in the balances of public Accountants cried out againſt — — — 56
has been ſuckled with the milk of the Treaſury 56
charged with acting impudently — 58
reprehended for his audacity. — — 58
Mr. Fox threatens to bring him to the Scaffold 60
freezes Mr. Burke's blood, and harrows up his ſoul 60
threatened with impeachment — — 62
repreſented as a cheat — — 62, 64
as a ſhuffler — — 63
compared to a murderer — — 64
accuſed of baſeneſs — — 65
called a puppet — — 65
imputes motives to Mr. Fox — — 66
charged with making an infamous loan — 66
accurſed obſtinacy — — 67
Mr. Fox declares he ſhould think himſelf the moſt infamous of mankind, if he ſhould ever join him 68, 73, 74
declares as much of Mr. Fox — — 69
the total of his loſſes ſummed up — 69
painted as a wretched financier — 71
accuſed of want of feeling — — 74
Mr. Fox dreads ſeeing him in office again — 81
defends his coalition with Mr. Fox 82, 86, 87

MR. FOX

charged by Lord North with indiſcriminate cenſure 4
his contempt and pity held by Lord North in equal indifference — — — 6
alarms the Houſe at the views of Lord North — 10
menaces Lord North with a day of reckoning 11
compares Lord North to Sir Robert Walpole for corruption, and charges him with having loſt half the empire by it — — — 11
a ſevere charge brought againſt him by Lord North 12
accuſes Lord North of puſillanimity — — 12
likens Lord North to Doctor Sangrado — — 13
threatens Lord North with an inquiry into the capture of General Burgoyne — — — 15

aſcribes

aſcribes to Lord North a ſingular way of recovering America — — — — 15
repreſents Lord North as ſuſpected, deteſted, and deſpiſed by America — — — 17
pronounces Lord North the contriver of our misfortunes 19
charged by Lord North with having gone very near ſpeaking treaſon — — — 19
ridicules Lord North — — — — 19, 26
pronounces Lord North deſerving cenſure — — 20
charges Lord North with being the *laſt* to learn what he ſhould be the *firſt* to know — — 20
accuſes Lord North of having betrayed the nation 20
declare he will never act with Lord North — — 22
arraigns the conduct of Lord North reſpecting Admiral Keppel — — — — 23
accuſes Lord North of avarice and ambition — — 23
charges Lord North with partiality — — 24
compares Lorn North with he Miniſter of Xerxes 25
pronounces the views of Lord North to be diſhoneſt and corrupt — — — — 27
charges Lord North with an act of public perfidy 31
accuſes Lord North of contemning the people of England — — — — 31
thought it would have been better Lord North had never been born — — — — 33
pronounces Lord North deſerving an Axe — — 35
diſdains the Idea of joining Lord North — — 37
pronounces Lord North impertinent and inſulting — 37
aſcribes the raiſing an illegal Army in Ireland to the ill Conduct of Lord North — — — 38
Lord North would rather have him for an Opponent than Commentator — — — 39
thinks the Influence of the Crown ought to be entirely deſtroyed — — — 39
alarmed at the Conduct of Lord North towards the Eaſt-India Company — — — 40
condemns Lord North's Syſtem — — — 42
cenſures Lord North for the Contract for Rum made with Mr. Atkinſon — — — 43
deſcribes Lord North's Country Gentleman — — 44
his opinion of Lord Thurlow — — — 45
charges Lord North with diſguſting the Army and Navy — — — — 45
arraigns Lord North of Miſconduct, Blunders, and Misfortunes — — — 46

MR.

Mr. FOX

cenſures Lord North for ſending Commiſſioners to America to treat for Peace ——— 51, 53
attacks Lord North for his abuſe of his Loans 52
aſſigns to Lord North Reaſons for continuing the American war —— —— 54
accuſes Lord North of Robbery —— 55
exclaims againſt touching the territorial Revenue of the Eaſt-India Company —— 55
cries out againſt Lord North's Mode of calling in the Balances of public accountants —— 56
repreſents Lord North as being ſuckled with the Milk of the Treaſury —— —— 56
charges Lord North with acting impudently — 58
reprehends him for his Audacity —— 58
threatens Lord North with the Scaffold —— 60
repreſents Lord North as a Shuffler —— 63
compares him to a Murderer —— 64
repreſents Lord North as a Cheat —— 64
accuſes him of Baſeneſs —— — 65
calls him a puppet —— —— 65
Motives imputed to him by Lord North — 66
charges Lord North with accurſed Obſtinacy — 67
ſpeaks againſt Coalition —— 68
would think himſelf the moſt infamous of Mankind, ſhould he join Lord North — 68, 73, 74
Lord North declares as much of Mr. Fox — 69
deſcribes Lord North as a wretched *financier* — 71
Secretary, Mr. promiſes to correct the influence of the Crown —— — 78
thinks the India Company ſhould have the Appointment of their own Servants —— 79
dreads his ſeeing Lord North in Office again —— 82
Lord North defends his Coalition with him 82, 86, 87
defend his Coalition with Lord North —— 83, 85
charges Lord North with being an Enemy to Freedom 85

Mr. BURKE

charges Lord North with Indignity and vileneſs 11
cenſures Lord North for ſuſpending the Habeas Corpus Act 12
compares Lord North to Sancho Panza's Phyſician 13
imputes the Capture of General Burgoyne to the Ignorance of Lord North —— —— 14
charges Lord North with a moſt remarkable inſtance of Sillineſs —— —— 15
accuſes Lord North of Impotence —— — 16

charges

Mr. BURKE

charges Lord North with raiſing Men without the Knowledge of Parliament ——— —— 17
reminded by Lord North of Pericles ——— 18
threatens Lord North with an inveſtigation into his conduct 19
reprobates Lord North's employing the Indians — 21
accuſes Lord North of Ignorance reſpecting the Toulon Fleet ——— —— —— 21
ridicules Lord North —— —— — 21
charges Lord North, in the moſt direct Terms, with the loſs of America ——— ——— 21
his Opinion of Reſponſibility ——— 28
is put in Mind, by Lord North, of a Story of Sir Godfrey Kneller —— ——— — 30
detects Lord North faſt aſleep ——— 31
pronounces the Places of Miniſtry not worth *his* Acceptance 33
talks of impeaching Lord North ——— 35
defies Lord North ever to take him by the *Paw* — 38
accuſes Lord North with acting in direct Contradiction to all honeſt and diſhoneſt Politicians that ever lived 40
denies we have a right to the territorial Revenues of the Eaſt India Company ——— 41, 44, 48, 49
reprobates the Miniſter's Conduct to Ireland — 43
Lord North freezes his Blood, and harrows up his Soul 60
threatens Lord North with Impeachment ——— 62
repreſents Lord North as a Cheat ——— 62
charges him with making an infamous Loan ——— 66
ſums up the Total of Lord North's Loſſes — 69
his Opinion how Government ought to be conducted 74
his Panegyric on the beſt of Sovereigns ——— 80